Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for rst order propositional and predicate calculus. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. The two direct translations turn out to be complete. The paper ful lls the program of Church 1932,33] and Curry 1930] to base logic on a consistent system of -terms or combinators. Hitherto this program had failed because systems of ICL were either too weak (to provide a sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes even inconsistent).
Introduction
The theory of combinators (Curry et al. 1958 (Curry et al. , 1972 ) and the lambda calculus (Church 1941] , Barendregt 1984] ) are theories that succesfully analyze the notion of e ective computability. However, the original founders of these subjects, Curry and Church, also had as aim to provide a basis for logic (and thereby mathematics) . Formal systems intended to achieve this are given in Church 1932 Church , 1933 and Curry 1930 Curry , 1931 Curry , 1932 Curry , 1933 Curry , 1934a Curry , 1934b Curry , 1935 . Unfortunately, it was shown in Kleene and Rosser 1935] that these systems are inconsistent. In Curry 1942c ] the inconsistency of Curry 1934] was simpli ed. This derivation, now known as`Curry's paradox', is akin the Russell paradox, but requires no properties of negation. It can be written in only a few lines.
Curry and his school then started a program of de ning several systems of illative combinatory logic (ICL) of varying strength, see Curry 1942a] . The goal was to` nd stronger and stronger systems which are consistent and weaker and weaker systems which are inconsistent but strong enough to interpret logic, hoping to end up with a consistent system in which logic can be interpreted' (quotation from Curry and Feys 1958] x8S3, p. 276).
Following this methodology, Bunder 1969 Bunder ], 1973 , 1974] introduced restrictions on the rules of the illative constants so that rst order propositional and predicate calculus can be interpreted in the resulting systems. Bunder 1983a] also allows much of set theory. In all these systems the usual derivation of Curry's paradox is blocked, but the consistency of these systems remains an open question. That the question is not academic was shown in Bunder 1976] and 1983a] , where related illative systems were proved to be inconsistent.
In the rest of this section we give a short introduction to illative combinatory logic by showing the early inconsistent system of Curry 1934] . In section 2 we introduce systems slightly weaker than the ones in Bunder 1973 Bunder , 1974 but strong enough to interpret logic. We derive roughly the following soundness result
where L represents propositional or predicate logic and ?] one of two possible translations of each system into an ICL system C (there will then be 4 such C's). Of the interpretations one is the propositions-as-types interpretation due to Curry, Howard and de Bruijn, the other is a more direct interpretation. Finally, in section 2 we show that the two interpretations are canonically related.
In section 3 we derive completeness results for 2 of the 4 systems of ICL. These, again roughly, take the following form ]`C A] ) `L A:
This completeness result implies the consistency of the ICL's involved.
Illative Combinatory Logic Now we will present a simple system I of illative combinatory logic in order to explain the general idea. The system is strong enough to represent the f ; 8g fragment of rst order intuitionistic predicate calculus.
The intuition behind the system I is as follows. Terms are type-free lambda terms extended by some extra constants. A term X is considered to have an assertive value. A term XZ can be seen as a statement saying`Z is of type X' or Z2X' or`Z satis es the predicate X'. The term` :X' corresponds to the class f jXg. There is a term such that the statement` XY ' is interpreted as`X Y ' or`(8x2X)Y x'. Using this one can de ne implication and quanti cation.
1.1. Definition. The system I is de ned as follows.
(i) T, the set of terms of I, is given by the following abstract grammar. T = V j j TT j V:T Here V is the syntactical category of variables and is a constant. We also write
since T is obtained from the set of type-free lambda terms by adding the constant .
(ii) On T the usual notion of -reduction is given by the contraction rules
Here FV(M) is the set of free variables of M. The resulting (more step) -reduction and -convertibility relation are denoted by ! ! and =. Syntactic equality is denoted by .
(iii) A statement of I is just an element of T. A basis is a set of statements.
(iv) Let ? be a basis and X be a statement, then X is derivable from ?, notation ?`X, if ?`X can be produced by the following natural deduction system. In the next section the illative system I will be formulated more carefully so that the system becomes consistent and in fact complete over ordinary logic.
2. Sound interpretations of logics in ICL's.
In the introduction we stated that logic can be interpreted in two ways in ICL's. In fact this can be done both for the propositional and predicate calculus, so there will be four related illative systems. The interpretation will be done for the f g (respectively f ; 8g) fragment of intuitionistic logic. This is the most essential part of logic and the direct interpretation ( ?] below) can be extended to include the logical operators :; & ; _ and 9. In second order logic these operators are de nable from ; 8, so both our interpretations can be extended into sound (and probably complete) interpretations of second order logical calculi. Now we display the two logical calculi that will be interpreted. Now the systems PROP and PRED will be interpreted in ICL's. In order to block the proof of the Curry paradox, Bunder 1969 Bunder , 1973 Bunder , 1974 modi ed the system I by restricting the -introduction rule and adding some other axioms and a rule. The resulting system I 0 was strong enough to provide sound interpretations of PROP and PRED while the proof of the Curry paradox was blocked. However the problems of the completeness of the interpretation and even of the consistency of I 0 remained open. (The system I 0 will be described later.)
We will give modi ed versions of I 0 in which the logics can be embedded in a sound way by two kinds of embeddings. The rst kind is`direct' and the second kind is according to the`propositions-as-types' and`proofs-as-terms' paradigm, see Barendregt 1992] , x5.1, x5. The four systems ICL will be described now and moreover their relative strengths will be compared.
2.3. Definition. Let T = ( ; L), be the set of type-free lambda terms extended by the extra constants and L. The four systems have the following speci c rules: If is a set of assumptions in a deduction in PROP or PRED, then ] i r is the set of translated assumptions. Note that '] 2 r in a sense represents a class.
Each '] 2 r x ' then represents the condition that '] 2 r is inhabited, corresponding to the fact that ' is assumed to be true.
The ? i r ( ) are grammatical conditions required for the variables of .
In the proof of the following proposition there is an unexpected di culty in showing the soundness of modus ponens. The di culty can be avoided by a trick, which however does not work for PRED as we will see and explain. However this is not true. The similar problem for PTS's (see Barendregt 1992] ) was rst noted by E. Barendsen 1989] . The point is that in ordinary (minimal, intuitionistic or classical) logic it is always assumed that the universes A 1 ; A 2 : : :
of the structure are supposed to be non-empty. For example
is provable in PRED, but only valid in structures with A 6 = ;. In so-called free logic one also allows structures with empty domains. This logic has been axiomatised by Peremans 1949] and Mostowski 1951] . What is unexpected is that the problem turns up in the case of modus ponens. (c.f. the proof of Proposition 2.14) (ii) By induction on the length of ' as in (i) but also using Lemma 2.6(ii We start with the proof of the completeness for I relative to PRED. This occupies subsections 3.1-3.11. The proof for IP relative to PROP in 3.12-3.14 goes in a similar way but is much easier. Hp`p Hp:
Using the grammar it will be shown that such mixed statements do not interfere with the logic. The translations of logical formulas will form a class P (propositions) in our grammar, and the other statements a class G (grammatical conditions).
3.2. Definition (Grammar for derivable statements in I ). T = T 1 j T 2 T 1 = V 1 j a j fT 1 j gT 1 T 2 T 2 = V 2 Completeness for IP relative to PROP The proof of this completeness follows the same pattern as the proof of the completeness for I relative to PRED, but it is easier. As in that proof it is su cient to take r I, i.e. we omit r.
3.12. Definition (Grammar for derivable statements for IP). P = V j P P G = HP j P G O = G j P: P; G and O are then de ned as in 3.2. It is possible to work with variants of these systems based on -conversion only.
Change the rules for I as follows. (ii) The additional primitive L added to ( ), was not strictly necessary. We could have used the de nition L = W and simpli ed our grammar for derivable statements in I in 3.2 in the following way: P = PT 1 j A i ( x i P) j (KP)(KP) G = A i T i j A i ( x i :G) j (KP)(KG):
Note that now L(KP) = (KP)(KP), so L(KP) shifts from G to P ! Similarly for IP H can be de ned as WP as was done in Curry 1942a] .
(iii) In the work of Seldin and others L is de ned as FEH where E is a universal class. Under this de nition Hp and L(Kp) are interderivable, but our proof of Proposition 3.10 fails.
(iv) The title of the paper refers to combinatory logic, but the systems used are based on lambda calculus throughout. The illative systems could have been based on combinatory logic using an appropriate bracket abstraction algorithm.
(v) For historical and other remarks concerning the combinators ; P; F and G, see Hindley and Seldin 1986] This weak consistency result was proved by a similar method in Bunder 1983b] .
